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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2008, “Siemens A.G., the German engineering giant,”
settled bribery cases in Germany and the United States by paying fines
and penalties of more than $1.6 billion.1 The U.S. actions were brought
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Mr. Reinhard Siekaczek,
an accountant for the firm, admitted that from 2002 to 2006 he oversaw
an annual bribery budget of approximately $40–$50 million at Siemens.2
“Matthew W. Friedrich, the acting chief of the [U.S. Department of Justice’s
(DOJ) Criminal Division], called the corruption at Siemens ‘systematic
and widespread.’ Linda C. Thomsen, the [Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC)] enforcement director, described it as ‘egregious
and brazen.’ Joseph Persichini Jr., the director of the [Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (FBI)] Washington field office, which led the investigation,
called it ‘massive, willful and carefully orchestrated.’”3
Company managers and sales staff used the slush fund to cozy up to
corrupt government officials worldwide. For example, according to
court documents, Siemens paid $5 million in bribes to the son of
Bangladesh’s Prime Minister and other senior officials in order to win a
mobile phone contract in the country. Mr. Siekaczek’s group also paid
$12.7 million in bribes to senior officials in Nigeria in order to secure
government contracts. In Argentina, a subsidiary of Siemens paid in
excess of $40 million in bribes to win a $1 billion contract to produce
national identity cards. In Israel, Siemens provided $20 million to senior
government officials to build power plants. Additionally, Siemens paid
$16 million to obtain urban rail lines in Venezuela, $14 million for
medical equipment in China, and $1.7 million to “Saddam Hussein and
his cronies” in Iraq.4
After decades of obscurity, the FCPA now occupies center stage in the
federal government’s war on white-collar crime.5 The DOJ increased the
1. Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At Siemens, Where Bribery Was Just a
Line Item, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, SundayBusiness, at 1, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id.
5. Many scholarly articles have been written about the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. See generally, Andrea Dahms & Nicolas Mitchell, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 605 (2007); Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83 (2007); Jack G.
Kaikati, George M. Sullivan, John M. Virgo, T. R. Carr & Katherine S. Virgo, The Price
of International Business Morality: Twenty Years Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 26 J. BUS. ETHICS 213 (2000); Rebecca Koch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
It’s Time to Cut Back the Grease and Add Some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
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number of its FCPA investigations sevenfold during the last three years,
and that is just the beginning. The DOJ has publicly announced its
intention to vigorously enforce the law and is hiring an army of new
prosecutors just to handle these cases.6
No one is immune from FCPA scrutiny. Current cases and subpoenas
directed to entire industries are probing every manner of transaction—
from a shipment of rice to the design of a space station. Whenever U.S.
business crosses a border, an FCPA investigation is now a distinct
possibility.7
It is well-known that the FCPA not only prohibits bribery of foreign
officials,8 but imposes reporting obligations on public companies—
somewhat similar to the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.9 But the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA also apply to private
businesses—both large and small—and to individuals, both in the
United States and abroad. Penalties can include stiff prison terms and
millions of dollars in fines. U.S. businesses and citizens can be held
accountable for the acts of their foreign sales and marketing agents,

REV. 379 (2005); Krever, supra; Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A
Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229
(1997); David E. Dworsky, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 671
(2009); Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action: Evaluating
and Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285 (2007); Barbara
Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, Investigation of Halliburton Co./TSKJ’s
Nigerian Business Practices: Model for Analysis of the Current Anti-Corruption
Environment on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 503 (2006).
6. In an October 2006 speech to the American Bar Association’s FCPA Institute,
Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher, then head of the DOJ’s Criminal Division,
announced an expanded doctrine of FCPA enforcement to “root out global corruption.”
She was quoted as saying “I want to send a clear message today that if a foreign
company trades on U.S. exchanges and benefits from U.S. capital markets, it is subject to
our laws.” Alice Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, speech to the American Bar
Association’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Institute (Oct. 16, 2006) available at
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/pr/speech/2006/10-16-06AAGFCPASpeech.pdf.
7. Virginia A. Davidson & Eric S. Zell, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Pitfalls In Doing Business Overseas, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, Nov./Dec. 2008, at 20.
8. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).

91

BIXBY (DO NOT DELETE)

12/9/2010 2:17 PM

distributors, and consultants—perhaps even without direct knowledge of
an illegal payment.10
Over the past three decades, the corrupt payment of foreign government
officials by U.S. business firms has evolved into an important public
issue connected to the globalization of international trade. Congress
enacted the FCPA in 197711 in order to prevent U.S. businesses and
individuals from using illicit payments to foreign officials “to influence
any official act, induce unlawful action, or obtain or retain business.”12
The world economy has evolved substantially in the thirty-two years
since the FCPA was originally enacted, as international trading by
multinational corporations from around the world has exploded and new
markets and new economic powers have emerged.
Since 1977, several events have contributed to change the way the
DOJ and the SEC have enforce the FCPA which include: two significant
amendments to the FCPA in the past twenty-one years, the influence of
increasing globalization, several significant international agreements,
and new anti-bribery laws in foreign countries. This article examines the
history of the FCPA and its provisions, the historical enforcement of the
FCPA and its influences on foreign anti-corruption laws, and recent
trends in enforcement of the FCPA. In order to better portray the
evolution of FCPA enforcement, a brief history of the origins of this law
and its provisions will also be provided. The following sections explain
the FCPA and detail the events that led to the enactment of the law in
1977, as well as the subsequent amendments to the law in 1988 and 1998.
II. HISTORY OF THE FCPA
The origins of the FCPA enactment can be traced to the Watergate
hearings and the connection of the Nixon administration to the failed
burglary of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters in
1972. Although the focus of the Watergate hearings was the attempted
burglary of the DNC headquarters, what former SEC enforcement chief
Stanley Sporkin found most interesting were illegal contributions to the
Nixon reelection campaign made by corporate executives. These illegal

10. See, Marie M. Dalton, Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification Of Cultural
Norms In The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 583, 605 (2006).
11. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)–(h),
78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff, amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments
of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff, and the International Anti-Bribery and
Fair Competition Act of 1998, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified at §§ 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 to
78dd-3, 78ff) [hereinafter FCPA].
12. Koch, supra note 5, at 383.
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contributions prompted Sporkin and his staff to conduct an investigation
examining the financial reports of these corporations with the purpose of
determining how these illegal payments were recorded on corporate
books.13
Upon further investigation, Sporkin and his team uncovered secret
mislabeled accounts that had been used to hide various illicit payments,
including funds used for bribes and other illegal political contributions
beyond the Nixon reelection campaign.14 The SEC chose to conduct a
formal investigation following Sporkin’s initial informal investigation,
the results of which brought to light some $300 million in questionable
or illegal payments made to foreign government officials, politicians,
and political parties by over 400 U.S. corporations, 117 of which were
Fortune 500 companies.15 These revelations caused the resignation of
many important officials in Japan, the Netherlands, Italy, and other
countries, as well as considerable public outcry in the United States.16
After completing these investigations, Sporkin (who later became a
federal district judge) and the SEC determined that the rash of illegal and
illicit payments could be curbed if legislation was passed to discourage
such actions by punishing “public companies that disguise bribes in their
books,” and in 1977, the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act in an attempt to respond to the public pressure to eliminate
foreign corruption by U.S. firms abroad.17 This new law was enacted as
an amendment to the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act.18
A. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977
The primary objective of the FCPA was to reduce or eliminate illicit
bribes made by U.S. firms to foreign officials. Simply stated, “the FCPA
prohibits any bribe to a foreign official to influence any official act,
induce unlawful action, or obtain or retain business,” and it requires that

13. John Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J., Mar. 18, 2007, at 50, available
at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/battling_bribery_abroad/.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Kaikati et al., supra note 5, at 213, 218.
17. Gibeaut, supra note 13, at 50
18. Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 5, at 605.
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publically traded companies achieve certain “standards regarding their
accounting practices, books, and records.”19
The FCPA, when enacted in 1977, had two primary provisions: the
anti-bribery provision and the accounting provision. The FCPA was first
amended in 1988 and then again in 1998. The following sub-sections of
this article detail the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the
FCPA, and the 1988 and 1998 amendments.
1. Anti-Bribery Provisions
The anti-bribery provisions were included in the FCPA to deter
corporations from using bribery as a tool of influence while doing
business with an official of a foreign nation. For the SEC and the DOJ
to successfully hinder the use of illegal and illicit bribery by U.S.
corporations, the FCPA had to be written in such a way that specifically
defined bribery:
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA . . . criminalize bribery of a foreign
official to influence any official act, induce any unlawful action, induce any
action that would assist in obtaining or retaining business, or secure any
improper advantage. These provisions prohibit individuals or businesses from
directly or indirectly offering, paying, promising, or authorizing to pay money
or anything of value to any foreign official.20

In order for a violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions to occur,
the SEC and DOJ must provide specific proof of the violation in
question. The FCPA provided a list of elements that must be proven by
the SEC or DOJ in determining if bribery has occurred; Table 1 lists
these necessary elements in order for a case to fall within the FCPA.

19.
20.
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Table 1: Elements of an FCPA Bribery Offense
(i)

(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

(v)
(vi)
(vii)

(viii)

A U.S. “issuer,” “domestic concern,” or “any person,” including
the officers, directors, employees, agents, or shareholders acting
on behalf of the issuer, domestic concern, or person;21
makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce;
in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or
authorization to pay anything of value;
to any foreign official, any foreign political party or official
thereof, or any candidate for foreign political office, or other
person, knowing that the payment to that other person would be
passed on to a foreign official, foreign political party or official
thereof or candidate for foreign political office;
inside the territory of the United States or, for any United States
personality, outside the United States;
to corruptly;
influence any official act or decision, induce an action or an
omission to act in violation of a lawful duty, or to secure any
improper advantage;
or induce any act or decision that would assist the company in
obtaining, retaining, or directing business to any person.22

The FCPA also provides two affirmative defenses—that is, there is no
liability for payments that are (1) legal in the country in which they are
made or (2) those considered “reasonable and bona fide expenditures.”23
Each defense could merit a thorough examination, but are beyond the
scope of this article.
In addition to these two affirmative defenses, the FCPA also allows
corporations to make facilitating, or so called “grease payments,” to
foreign government officials for “routine government actions,” which by

21. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), (g) (for issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a), (i) (for domestic
concerns) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (for “any person”).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3; see also Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 5,
at 614–15.
23. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 5003, 102 Stat. 1415, 1420–21 (1988).
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FCPA standards are considered to be “non-discretionary actions” that
are ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official.24 For
example, obtaining permits, licenses or other official documents,
expediting lawful customs clearances, obtaining entry or exit visas . . . .”25
Unfortunately, the FCPA does not specify a cap amount that would be
considered in excess of grease payment. The issue of grease payments is
examined in further detail later in this article.26
2. Accounting Provisions
In addition to the anti-bribery provision, the FCPA also included specific
provisions with regard to accounting and bookkeeping standards the
SEC and DOJ should consider when examining a case that may fall
within the FCPA. The accounting provisions of the FCPA have been
described as follows:
The FCPA amended the Exchange Act by adding record-keeping and internal
control requirements for certain entities already subject to the Exchange Act’s
provisions. As a result, even non-material payments not recorded accurately
could constitute a violation of U.S. law. The principal accounting provisions
are contained in 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) and b(5), which state the record-keeping
and internal control requirements, as well as the necessary standard to impose
criminal liability for a failure to meet these requirements.27

Not only does the FCPA define the accounting provisions, but it also
specifies the parties to whom the law is intended to apply. For the
purposes of law enforcement by the SEC and DOJ, the accounting
provisions in the FCPA primarily apply to those publicly-held entities
considered “issuers”—companies that either have securities registered
with the SEC under section 12 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or
are required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.28
The FCPA offers a further explanation of the parties to whom the
accounting provisions apply:
The accounting provisions are broad and apply to all dealings undertaken by the
issuer, regardless of whether the business actually engages in foreign operations
or whether the transaction is considered a bribe. In addition, an issuer that

24. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(2000) & 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-3(b)(2000).
25. Foley and Lardner, LLP, The FCPA Explained, FCPA ENFORCEMENT, http://
fcpaenforcement.com/explained/explained.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
26. See infra Part III.A.
27. Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 5, at 609.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2006). See also Dworsky, supra note 5, at 676–77.
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controls more than fifty percent of the stock of a foreign subsidiary must ensure
that the subsidiary adheres to the books and records provisions.29

For the purposes of the FCPA, therefore, an entity that owns more
than 50% of the voting stock in another entity, as defined by the
Financial Account Standards Board, is a corporation considered to have
“control” over the foreign subsidiary.
B. Amendments to the FCPA
The FCPA has been amended on two separate occasions: first in 1988
and then again in 1998. The first amendment in 1988 was an indirect
amendment necessary in part due to the passage of the federal Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act (OTCA). The second amendment to the
FCPA occurred in 1998 as a direct amendment to the law. The
following subsections outline both amendments to the FCPA.
1. The 1988 Amendment
The first amendment to the FCPA came about in the form of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.30 This law was in
response to slumping foreign trade between the United States and
international firms, as the U.S. trade deficit continued to grow.31 As one
scholar noted following of the 1988 amendment to the FCPA:
During the 1980s, critics began calling for modification of the FCPA. In 1988,
the FCPA was revised under the aegis of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act (OTCA). According to Senator Heinz, one of the principal sponsors of the
1988 Amendments to the FCPA, the changes embodied an effort to eliminate
some exportation obstacles facing U.S. firms in the era of a burdensome trade
deficit. Of particular concern were charges that the FCPA as originally enacted
was so vague as to be indecipherable. Critics contended that U.S. businesses
shunned legitimate transactions, the legality of which was difficult to assess
under the statute’s ambiguous language.32

29. Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 5, at 609–10; see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006)
(FCPA text).
30. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988,
H. R. REP. NO. 100-576 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1988/tradeact-100-418.pdf.
31. Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Unnecessary Costs of Fighting Corruption?, 61 LA . L. REV. 861, 867–70 (2001) (discussing
competitive disadvantage that American corporations face because of the FCPA).
32. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market, supra note 5, at 243.
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The reasons for addition of the 1988 amendment to the FCPA appear
to have been three-fold: (1) to promote participation in international
trade by U.S. corporations, (2) to help participating corporations avoid
FCPA violations while engaging in international trade, and (3) a direction
by Congress to the executive branch to “recommend” that other nations
pass anti-corruption laws. The second amendment to the FCPA in 1998,
which is detailed in the following subsection, was passed for very different
reasons.
2. The 1998 Amendment
A decade after the passage of the 1988 amendment to FCPA, the law
was amended a second time. Corruption in foreign countries by U.S.
corporations was still common, even after the 1988 amendment, but by
1998, the United States and the world economy had undergone dramatic
change. The United States had experienced Desert Storm in 1991, but
more importantly, the global market had opened up with the collapse of
Communism in Russia and the 1989 destruction of the Berlin Wall.
With the adoption of the FCPA in 1977, the United States became the
first country to adopt a sweeping law prohibiting bribery of foreign officials,
and for many years it was alone in having such a law. American companies
often complained that this law put them at a distinct disadvantage in
obtaining international business since bribery and kickbacks were a
regular feature of commerce in many nations.33 With the encouragement
of the United States,34 the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) enacted the “Convention on Combating Bribery

33. See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 2 (1998) (describing disadvantages faced by
American businesses relative to foreign competitors prior to 1998); Taylor, supra note
23, at 869. See also Sara Nathan, U.S. Tie Loans to Corruption: Weigh Bribery in Aid
Decisions, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 17, 1999 (industry groups claim $30 billion in lost business
from mid-1997 to mid-1998).
34. “As the United States ramped up the FCPA in 1998, it also persuaded the 30
industrialized nations belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development to sign a treaty agreeing to adopt similar laws.” Gibeaut, supra note 13, at
50–51. Indeed the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA had required that the President
pursue the negotiation of an international agreement with the member countries of the
OECD to govern acts prohibited by the FCPA. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, 924 (1988)
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1957. See also the discussion of the
U.S. interests in the OECD treaty at: Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions:
Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation As Economic Sanctions Against Emerging
Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 391–92 (2010).
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of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions” in
November 1997 (effective in February 1999).35
The OECD—an organization originally composed of thirty economically
strong Western European, North American and Asian nations; but today
composed of thirty-three members from around the world—was created
to provide “a setting where governments can compare policy experiences,
seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and co-ordinate
domestic and international policies.”36 The purpose of the OECD
Convention was to combat the widespread effects of bribery throughout
the world. According to the organization’s own materials, the OECD
“brings together the governments of countries committed to democracy
and the market economy from around the world to:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Support sustainable economic growth
Boost employment
Raise living standards
Maintain financial stability
Assist other countries’ economic development
Contribute to growth in world trade”37

The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery is not self-executing,
rather it requires each member nation to enact a law in its own country
prohibiting bribery of foreign and international officials and organizations.38
The OECD explains the purpose of the OECD Convention as follows:

35. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, INT’L MONETARY FUND, Sept. 18, 2001, at 3,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/gov/2001/eng/091801.pdf.
36. The OECD: What Is It?, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.
(2008) at 7, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/33/34011915.pdf.
37. About OECD, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.
oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.
38. All thirty-three OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) and seven non-signed OECD countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Estonia, Slovenia, and South Africa) have signed the
OECD Convention. See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 6 October
2010, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org.libproxy.
boisestate.edu/dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
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[T]he Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business
Transactions, adopted by the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on 23 May 1997 . . . called for effective
measures to deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in
connection with international business transactions, in particular the prompt
criminalization of such bribery in an effective and coordinated manner and in
conformity with the agreed common elements set out in that Recommendation
and with the jurisdictional and other basic legal principles of each country . . . .39

As a founding member of the OECD and a leading proponent of the
Convention, clearly U.S. compliance with the agreement was important,
and it became a congressional priority. In order to properly align the
FCPA with the OECD convention, the FCPA needed to be amended.
Congress ratified the OECD Convention and enacted implementing
legislation, and “these new amendments broadened the reach of potential
FCPA bribery violations by expanding the scope of persons covered by
the Act to include some foreign nationals.”40 However, the most important
effect of the 1998 amendment to the FCPA was that it extended the
FCPA’s jurisdiction beyond U.S. borders to allow greater enforcement
efforts by U.S. prosecutors. Essentially, this meant that the reach of the
amended FCPA had been expanded and thus allowed for an increase in
SEC and DOJ enforcement of the FCPA which represented a step
forward in the battle against corruption in foreign business practices.41
The 1998 amendment to the FCPA redefined the parties to whom the
anti-bribery provisions applied. Prior to the 1998 amendment, the FCPA
applied only to those persons considered either “issuers” of stock in
controlling corporations and persons considered part of “U.S. domestic
concerns” in foreign nations. The wording in the 1998 amendment added
the phrase, “any person,” meaning that the FCPA now applied to any

39. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., (Apr. 10,
1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf.
40. Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 5, at 607.
41. The 1998 amendments subject foreign nationals who are agents or employees
of U.S. issuers to criminal penalties under the FCPA. Securities Exchanges Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (2006). In addition, the 1998 amendments broaden the definition of
“foreign official” to include any officer of a “public international organization.” 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f). The FCPA adopts the definition of a “public international organization”
from the International Organizations Immunity Act. 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006). But see
Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Julia Birmele, The 1998 OECD
Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in
Business Transactions, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 515–17 (2000) (discussing potential
weaknesses and unresolved issues in OECD including the conduct of bribe-takers,
coercive forms of bribery, the tax deductibility of bribes, and the shortcomings of
implementing legislation).
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individual who could be considered an agent of a corporation or any
official, regardless of governmental level, in a foreign nation.42
In addition to adding the category of “any person,” the 1998 amendments
removed the requirement of a territorial nexus between the corrupt act
and the United States. Consequently, the FCPA now permits prosecution of
U.S. issuers and persons for any act regardless of whether any means of
interstate commerce are used. The new part of the law expanded the FCPA
to provide that a foreign company or person was now subject to liability
if it caused, either directly or through an “agent,” an act in furtherance of
the corrupt payment to take place within the United States.43 This change
suggests that the FCPA can reach foreign agents and employees of domestic
concerns, as well as U.S. nationals living anywhere in the world who
have very little contact with the United States.44
This expansive view of federal powers under the FCPA has led to
criticism by several commentators. Attorney Justin Marceau argues
forcefully that the DOJ’s “newly clarified theory of foreign entity liability
must be challenged in court. The prosecution of foreign entities, outside
of certain narrowly defined statutory parameters, must be struck down
by federal courts.”45 Marceau is particularly critical of the DOJ action
against DPC-Diagnostics. This producer of medical equipment admitted
to paying $1.6 million in bribes to physicians and laboratory personnel
in China to obtain business there. Under the 1998 amendment to the
FCPA, foreign nationals were made subject to the FCPA for the first
time so long as the person or entity committed an act in furtherance of
the corrupt payment “while in the territory of the United States.”
However, DPC was a wholly owned subsidiary of a California company
and had not committed any of the acts in the United States.46
Nevertheless the DOJ prosecuted, and obtained a guilty plea based on

42. The 1998 amendments expand the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the FCPA by
proscribing bribery committed outside U.S. territory by issuers (including an officer,
director, employee, agent, or stockholder acting upon behalf of such issuer) and any
“U.S. person.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(g) (for issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(i) (2006) (for
domestic concerns).
43. Carolyn Hotchkiss, The Sleeping Dog Stirs: New Signs of Life in Efforts to End
Corruption in International Business, 17 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 108 (1998).
44. Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 5, at 607.
45. Marceau, supra note 5, at 296–310.
46. Id. at 294–95, citing Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, DPC (Tianjin) Ltd.
Charged with Violating The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (May 20, 2005), available at
www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/press/dpcfcpa.pdf.
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the theory that DPC was an agent of the American company. Marceau
argues that this approach clearly violated the legislative history of, and
previous case history related to the FCPA.47
The amendments to the FCPA in 1988 and 1998 changed the
interpretation of the law and the way the SEC and DOJ investigated
FCPA violations. Prior to the amendments, interpretation of the FCPA
varied due to the confusing, and often vague, wording written into the
original 1977 law. For this, and other reasons, enforcement of the FCPA
during the first quarter century after its enactment was fairly sparse.
However, the number of FCPA cases brought by the SEC and DOJ has
exploded in recent years.
C. FCPA Enforcement
The next subsections of this report briefly address certain federal anticorruption actions taken prior to the enforcement of the FCPA, then
enforcement of the law after the 1998 amendment to the FCPA, and
finally the changes in FCPA enforcement that have taken place over the
past six years. Tables 2 through 7, which can be found in the appendices
A, B, and C accompanying this article, provide lists of anti-corruption
cases brought prior to the enactment of the FCPA, a list of FCPA cases
prior to the 1998 amendment, and a list of notable FCPA cases initiated
in the past five years.
1. The First Twenty-Five Years
Prior to the enforcement of the FCPA, the DOJ brought a total of
fifteen cases against corporations and individuals for bribery-related
offenses that might have fallen under the jurisdiction of the FCPA’s antibribery provision.48 As indicated by this limited number of cases brought
by the DOJ, as well as by the outcome of those cases, anti-bribery
enforcement appears to have been concerned with: the Currency and
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (CFTRA); Mail and Wire Fraud;
False statements to Export-Import Bank, the Commerce Department,
and Agency for International Development; and Conspiracy to defraud

47. Id. at 309. See also Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial
Discretion in Corporate Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1436–37
(2007).
48. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST OF CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES
RELATING TO BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT OF 1977 371–73 (2010), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPADigest-Spring-2010.pdf.
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the Federal Maritime Administration.49 A list of these pre-FCPA cases
can be found in Table 2, located in Appendix A of this article.
This subsection presents a history of the enforcement of the FCPA
during its initial twenty-five years. During the first quarter century of
the FCPA’s history, enforcement of the law appears to have been
minimal, at best. Over this time period, the SEC and the DOJ pursued
only about sixty FCPA cases against corporations in violation of the
FCPA, or an average of slightly more than two per year.50 Clearly, the
FCPA was underutilized in achieving the purposes for which the law
was created. Additionally, the actual lack of enforcement of the law
may also indicate how the ambiguous wording in the law may have
dissuaded companies from venturing overseas for business during the
first decade of FCPA enforcement. One author stated: “the 1988
amendment was largely in response to complaints by U.S. corporations
that the original Act was too vague and wide in scope.”51
Enforcement of the FCPA after enactment and up to the 1998
amendment consisted of DOJ prosecutions of twenty-five cases.52 A list
of these cases, including dates, parties to the cases, as well as details and
outcomes is contained in Appendix B of this article within Tables 3, 4,
and 5. The outcomes of these twenty-five FCPA cases prosecuted by the
DOJ resulted in approximately $35.2 million in total fines, fees, and
penalties levied against the defendants. The most prominent FCPA
cases during the first two decades of the law’s enforcement involved the
illegal sale of U.S. arms to Middle-Eastern nations.53 All of these cases
involved violations of the FCPA, either bribery or “books and records”
problems; some also involved violations of the CFTRA; conspiracy to
violate the FCPA; false statements; and wire fraud and money laundering.
The following subsection addresses the enforcement of the FCPA
from 2003 through late 2010.

49. Id.
50. Gibeaut, supra note 13, at 48
51. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 33 N. C. J. INT’L. & COM. REG. 83, 88 (2007).
52. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30.
53. Patrick M. Norton, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Dilemma, 33 CHINA
BUS. REV. 22, 23 (2006).
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2. Enforcement from 2003 to the Present
In the current post-Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) era, the SEC
and the DOJ have dramatically increased civil and criminal enforcement
of the FCPA, compared with the previous twenty-five years.54 Not only
are these agencies bringing many more cases, but the DOJ is also starting
to utilize novel theories of liability to prevent corrupt corporations from
avoiding prosecution.55 As previously mentioned, the relatively lowlevel of FCPA enforcement during this period may have been caused by
the vagueness of this anti-corruption law,56 as well as the blind eye the
federal government apparently had turned towards the subject of foreign
corruption by U.S. corporations.
Since 2004, however, both the SEC and DOJ have begun to
aggressively enforce the law. The SEC hired hundreds of employees
to enforce corporate compliance cases, the DOJ hired two attorneys to
focus only on FCPA cases, and the FBI created a new four-person unit
which handles only FCPA investigations.57 Government officials publicly
announced that they will be monitoring companies for FCPA violations
more carefully than they have before.58

54. See, e.g., Emma Schwartz, Hiking the Cost of Bribery, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Aug. 13, 2007, at 31 (“[I]n recent years, federal prosecutors have begun cracking
down on companies and their executives for bribing officials overseas. . . . Using a 1977
law, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the feds have prosecuted four times the number
of foreign bribery cases in the past five years as in the preceding five.”).
55. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, supra note 5 at 285. For example,
Marceau begins his article with these comments: “In the wake of increasingly common,
creative, and severe prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”),
scholars and practitioners must acknowledge that the time for talk—i.e., non-punitive
voluntary disclosures and abstract debate—has given way to an era of aggressive
enforcement actions by the Department of Justice and the Securities Exchange
Commission. The bare numbers tell much of the story: the Department of Justice has
initiated four times more prosecutions over the last five years than over the previous five
years. Also instructive are prosecutors’ growing use of novel and ever more broad
theories of liability under the FCPA.” Id.
56. See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, Information Technology in the War Against
International Bribery and Corruption: The Next Frontier of Institutional Reform, 38
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 89 n.161 (2001).
57. Sue Reisinger, On Bended Knee: Companies Are Disclosing Overseas Bribes
in Record Numbers. But Is Confession Always Necessary?, CORP. COUNSEL (July 1,
2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=900005484219.
58. See, e.g., Eric Torbenson, Tougher Laws Have Reduced Financial Fraud, SEC
Official Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 14, 2007, at A5 (quoting Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Barry Sabin), available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/
dws/bus/stories/DN-sec_14bus.ART.State.Edition1.35aca7f.html.
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In 2003, the DOJ prosecuted two FCPA cases, while the SEC failed to
institute a single FCPA case.59 This total of two FCPA prosecutions in
2003 represented a fairly typical number of FCPA cases pursued by these
two federal entities during the previous twenty-five years.60 However,
2004 proved to be the beginning of change regarding FCPA prosecutions.
During that year, the DOJ once again prosecuted only two FCPA cases,
but the SEC brought three FCPA prosecutions, compared to zero in the
previous year.61
The number of SEC-prosecuted FCPA cases steadily increased on a
yearly basis over the next three years. FCPA prosecutions brought by
the SEC grew to five in 2005, eight in 2006, then jumped to twenty in
2007. Another thirteen actions were brought in 2008, and fourteen more
instituted in 2009.62 Similarly, FCPA prosecutions by the DOJ during
this five-year timeframe produced comparable results.63 The DOJ brought
two prosecutions in 2003, two in 2004, seven in 2005, seven in 2006,
eighteen cases in 2007, twenty in 2008, and twenty-six in 2009.64
The activity continues to increase. In fact, since January of 2007, the
SEC has brought forty-seven FCPA actions, and the DOJ has instituted
sixty-four actions—considerably more than all of the actions filed from
1977–2003.65 These figures do not include the numerous investigations
currently underway and self-disclosures that will likely lead to FCPA
enforcement. The recent trend of increased FCPA enforcement activity
is best captured in the following chart and graph, which each track the
number of FCPA enforcement actions filed by DOJ and the SEC during
the past six years:66

59. Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher, LLP, 2007 Year-End FCPA Update (Jan. 4, 2008),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2007Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx [hereinafter
Gibson, Dunn 2007 Year-End FCPA Update].
60. From 1978 to 2000, the federal government “averaged only about three FCPArelated prosecutions a year.” Priya Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to
Watch, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1449 (2008).
61. Gibson, Dunn 2007 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 59.
62. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, 2009 Year-End FCPA Update (Jan. 4, 2010),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/2009Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx [hereinafter
Gibson, Dunn 2009 Year-End FCPA Update].
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (chart and graph).
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The following are a few examples of recent FCPA enforcement and
compliance actions:
• In September 2010 the SEC announced that it had reached a
settlement with ABB Ltd, a Swiss engineering company, to
pay $39.3 million in fines (without admitting guilt) regarding
charges for violating the FCPA. ABB and two subsidiaries, ABB
Inc. of Sugar Land, Texas and ABB LTD-Jordan, based in
Amman, had been charged with paying more than $2.7 million in
bribes to receive contracts worth $100 million. ABB Ltd. later
agreed to pay the DOJ $19 million in criminal fines and pleaded
guilty to one count of conspiracy and one count of violating
the FCPA to settle its subsidiaries legal matters.67
• Daimler AG agreed in March 2010 to pay $185 million (split
almost evenly between the SEC and DOJ) to settle allegations
that it had committed serious violations of the FCPA. The
DOJ had accused the German automaker of making hundreds

67. ABB To Pay $39.3 Million to Settle Subsidiaries’ FCPA Violations, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 29, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2010/09/29/abb-to-pay-393million-to-settle-subsidiaries-fcpa-violations/.
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of improper payments worth tens of millions of dollars to
secure government contracts in at least twenty-two countries,
including China, Russia and Greece.68
On January 19, 2010, following a “sting” operation at a Las
Vegas trade show, the DOJ indicted twenty-two executives and
employees in the military and law enforcement equipment
industry for engaging in a scheme to bribe the minister of
defense of an African country. This action involved 150 FBI
agents, was the first use of undercover techniques to discover
FCPA violations, and was the largest single investigation and
prosecution against individuals to date.69
In February 2009, Halliburton and its KBR subsidiary agreed
to pay $579 million in disgorgement and penalties to settle
charges that one of its former units bribed Nigerian officials
during the construction of a gas plant.70
As we noted at the beginning of this article, on December 15,
2008, the SEC announced an “unprecedented settlement” of
$800 million with Siemens AG as a result of extensive and
systematic practices that violated the FCPA. Siemens AG also
settled with the German Government for $854 million for the
same violations, for a combined historic penalty of $1.654
billion related to foreign corrupt practices.71
In September 2008, Albert “Jack” Stanley, former officer and
director of Halliburton, admitted that he had conspired to pay
Nigerian officials $180 million for engineering, procurement,

68. Vanessa Fuhrmans & Thomas Catan, Daimler to Settle With U.S. on Bribes,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2010, B1.
69. Ronald W. Breaux et al., Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
The Hits Keep Coming, HAYNES & BOONE, LLP, Feb. 1, 2010, http://www.haynes
boone.com/enforcement_of_the_fcpa/.
70. Alan M. Field, Long Arm, Getting Longer, J. OF COM., Dec. 21, 2009, 26,
available at http://www.joc.com/trade/long-arm-getting-longer. According to the indictment,
Jeffrey Tesler, a U.K. solicitor acting as agent for the joint venture partners in the Bonny
Island natural gas pipeline project, passed along millions of dollars from the joint venture
to top-level Nigerian officials in exchange for the award of more than $6 billion in
contracts. Included in the recipients were 3 vice-presidents of the government. Gibson, Dunn
2009 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 62, at 3.
71. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging
in Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008294.htm.
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and construction contracts spanning more than a decade. Stanley
now faces years in prison and $10.8 million in fines.72
That same month, a sixty-two-year-old assistant to the vice
president for a telecommunications company, Alcatel CIT, was
sentenced to thirty months in prison for paying $2.5 million to
Costa Rican officials in exchange for $149 million in mobile
telephone contracts.
On May 14, 2008, Wilbros Group, Inc., an engineering and
construction company, reached a $32.3 million settlement with
the DOJ and SEC for bribing Nigerian and Ecuadorian officials
and failing to keep adequate records pursuant to the FCPA.73
In the largest penalty in 2007, Baker Hughes entered into
a plea agreement with the SEC and the DOJ that led to a
combined fine of $44 million.74
In November 2007, Chevron agreed to pay $30 million in civil
and criminal penalties for: (1) unlawful kickbacks under the
UN Oil for Food Program during Saddam Hussein’s rule in
Iraq, and (2) the failure to maintain proper books and records
as required by the FCPA.75
In October 2007, Ingersoll-Rand Co. paid $2.5 million in civil
and criminal penalties for the travel and entertainment
expenses spent on eight Iraqi officials that exceeded $20,000.76

These very different cases indicate the government is looking for targets
large and small, individual and corporate, public and private, high-tech
and low-tech. Anyone considering doing business overseas needs a
basic understanding of the FCPA and needs to develop some simple
compliance strategies.

72. See also, Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen Lacey, Investigation of
Halliburton Co./TSJ’s Nigerian Business Practices: Model for Analysis of the Current
Anti-Corruption Environment on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, at 503–05 (2006) (describing the confluence of French,
DOJ, SEC, and Nigerian investigations into Halliburton/TSKJ).
73. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Willbros Group and Former
Employees with Foreign Bribery (May 14, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/
2008-86.htm.
74. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Baker Hughes, Inc., Acct’g and Auditing. Enforc.
Rel. No. 2602, 2007 SEC LEXIS 858, at *1–7 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2007); United States
v. Baker Hughes Servs. Int’l, Inc., No. 4:07-CR-00129 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2007).
75. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chevron Corp., No. 07 CIV 10299, 2007 SEC
LEXIS 2625, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2007).
76. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., No. 07-CV-01955, 2007 SEC
LEXIS 2532, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2007).
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A brief list of some notable FCPA cases prosecuted by both the SEC
and DOJ over the past six years can be found in Tables 6 through 8,
located in Appendix C of this report. These tables contain the dates,
names of the parties to the cases, and details and outcomes of each case.
By examining the sample list of cases presented in Tables 6 through 8,
the significant increase in FCPA prosecutions throughout the past six
years can be evidenced, not only by the numbers of cases, but also by the
amount of fines, fees, and penalties levied against the defendants.
One important difference between FCPA prosecutions in previous
decades compared to those of the past five years is that the penalties now
often include the disgorgement of profits tied to the actions deemed to be
FCPA violations. In the past few years, the SEC and DOJ have been
regularly demanding the disgorgement of profits when dealing with
FCPA violators. Inclusion of these profits has led to a dramatic increase
in the level of the total amount of fines, fees, and penalties levied by the
SEC and DOJ. For the cases included in Tables 6 through 8 included in
Appendix C of this article, the total amount of fines, fees, and penalties,
with disgorged profits included, is a total of $2,421,681,799.
Note that Tables 6 through 8 in Appendix C is not a complete list of
FCPA prosecutions since 2002. It also should be noted that in the case
against Titan Corporation,77 the total fine included, “a criminal fine of
$13 million, along with a civil penalty and disgorgement to the SEC in
the amount of approximately $15.5 million. . . . The combined penalty,
$28.5 million, was at that time the largest fine ever imposed on a
company in the history of the FCPA.”78 Considering the size of this fine
against a single corporation, amounting to nearly as much as the total
fines levied by the DOJ and SEC prior to 2002, it is easy to see that the
federal government has changed its position on corruption significantly.
The increases in the numbers of FCPA cases brought by the federal
government in recent years can be attributed to new trends and creative
prosecution of FCPA violations by the SEC and DOJ. The following
section and subsections of this report address such trends.

77. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. The Titan Corp., No. CIV.A. 05-0411 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19107.htm.
78. DANFORTH NEWCOMB, FCPA DIGEST OF CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING
TO BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977
114 (2007).
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III. RECENT FCPA ENFORCEMENT TRENDS
A. “Grease” Payments
According to Alexandra Wrage, president of a U.S. firm that provides
much anti-bribery training for U.S. and foreign businesspeople engaged
in overseas commerce, the ambiguous wording of the FCPA and the
breadth of interpretations of what constitutes a violation continue to
create problems for businesses operating in foreign nations.79
Although the FCPA prohibits nearly all forms of gifts or monetary
contributions to high-level foreign officials, the law does allow for the
use of “facilitating payments” made to low-level foreign officials for the
purposes of expediting or secure performance of government actions
considered routine. This type of bribe, often called a “grease payment,”
is permitted under the FCPA.80 Unfortunately, the ambiguity of the
FCPA has created problems in determining the level of monies that are
allowed to be made in the form of grease payments, as the FCPA does
not provide a cap for legal facilitating payments. However, although
nothing in the law sets any limit, in practice, there appears to be a maximum
ceiling of about $1,000 for grease payments.81
While many critics like Koch believe that the legality of grease
payments only contributes to the much larger problem of corruption that
the FCPA was created to curb, others point out that this form of payment
is a regular cost of doing business overseas that can easily be hidden. In
his 2006 article, Segal addresses the issue of what the SEC or DOJ could
do to better enforce the FCPA against corrupt corporations that successfully
hide bribes and other FCPA-prohibited payments in financial statements:
[I]ncreasing the difficulty of tracing money is a critically important part of any
corrupt enterprise’s operation if it wishes to avoid detection. A review of the
cases shows that more than half of those caught bribing could either have
avoided detection easily, or made it much more difficult to prosecute them had
only simple steps been taken to disguise money flows. As a result, without greatly
increased funding for investigation, the FCPA is a flawed model on which to base
all expectations of foreign bribery deterrence.82

79. Sheri Qualters, Risk of Bribe Probes Grows for Business, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 7,
2008, at 9. Another article quoted Ms. Wrage as stating that when she offered a course
dealing with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Dubai in 2005 only 20 people showed
up, but when the course was offered again in November 2006 more than 220 people
attended, some from as far away as Bangladesh and Greece. Gibeaut, supra note 13, at 48.
80. Koch, supra note 5, at 380.
81. Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 5, at 617–18.
82. Philip Segal, Coming Clean on Dirty Dealing: Time for a Fact-Based Evaluation
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L., 169, 171–72 (2006).
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“Facilitating” or “grease payments” represent one example of the
problems with FCPA interpretation, and it is differences in interpretation,
as well as an increase in government and social pressure, both domestically
and abroad, which have created new trends of FCPA enforcement and
interpretation. The following subsections of this article detail some of
the more significant changes in enforcement of the FCPA that have taken
place over the past six years, including the enforcement of the FCPA
against individuals, FCPA enforcement in foreign countries, and the
self-reporting of FCPA violations by corporations.83
B. FCPA Enforcement against Individuals
One of the more important trends in FCPA enforcement in recent
years has been the application of the FCPA against individual persons.
During 2006, the DOJ and SEC aggressively pursued FCPA action
against ten individuals in seven separate cases,84 and FCPA charges
were filed in cases against fifteen individuals during 2007.85 Although
the FCPA is commonly perceived—and perhaps, historically speaking,
with good reason—to be a statute of predominantly corporate enforcement,
60% of the FCPA defendants in 2008 were individuals. Mark
Mendelsohn, the Deputy Chief of the Fraud Section in DOJ’s Criminal
Division and DOJ’s top-FCPA enforcer for several years, said of the
continuing trend of holding individuals to answer for foreign bribery:
“To really achieve the kind of deterrent effect we’re shooting for, you
have to prosecute individuals.”86 SEC Associate Director Fredric Firestone,
speaking at a separate engagement, expressed a similar sentiment: “The
Commission [SEC] very clearly has stated to us that enforcement actions

83. See Philip Urofsky & Danforth Newcomb, Recent Trends and Patterns in
FCPA Enforcement, Shearman & Sterling LLP, October 1, 2009, available at http://
www.shearman.com/files/upload/LT-100209-FCPA-Digest-Recent-Trends-and-Patternsin-FCPA-Enforcement.pdf.
84. F. Joseph Warin, Robert C. Blume, Jeremy A. Bell & J. Taylor McConkie,
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Recent Developments, Trends, and Guidance, 21
Insights 2, 4–5 (Feb. 2007), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Docu
ments/Warin-Blume-FCPA-RecentDevelopmentsTrendsandGuidance.pdf.
85. Gibson, Dunn 2007 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 59.
86. Dionne Searcey, To Combat Overseas Bribery, Authorities Make It Personal,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2009, at A 13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1254958
62894771979.html?mod=article-outset-box.
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against individuals as well as companies is a priority.”87 The message
seems to be effective. Sharie Brown, who heads the FCPA practice at
the law firm DLA Piper, says the new strategy has prompted corporate
boards and senior managers to strengthen compliance measures to ward off
bribery. Brown added: “Imprisonment is something that few senior
executives ever think they will face.”88
Not only have federal cases been brought against U.S. citizens for FCPA
violations, cases have also been brought against foreign individuals as
well. In 2006, the DOJ brought FCPA charges against an Iraqi citizen
employed by a government contractor working in Iraq:
On March 24, 2006, the DOJ announced that Faheem Mousa Salam, an
employee of a government contractor working in Iraq, had been arrested and
charged with violating the FCPA. According to the criminal complaint, Salam
offered a bribe to a senior official with the Iraqi Police to induce him to
purchase a map printer and 1,000 armored vests. . . . Salam also met and
discussed additional improper payments with an undercover agent posing as a
U.S. procurement officer. On August 4, 2006, the DOJ announced that Salam
pled guilty to an FCPA anti-bribery charge. . . . the case is notable in that it was
based only on an offer of an improper gift, rather than an actual payment. It
also provides a rare example of the use of the statute’s nationality-based
jurisdiction to charge an individual.89

An additional case exists involving a foreign individual charged with
FCPA violations. In United States v. Si Chan Wooh, Wooh was named
as a defendant in a separate case related to the case against Schnitzer
Steel and SSI International Far East, Ltd:
Wooh, a former Executive Vice President and head of SSI, conspired with
Schnitzer Steel, SSI, and SSI International Far East, Ltd. (a South Korea-based
wholly-owned subsidiary of Schnitzer managed by SSI) to make payments to
officers and employees of government-owned customers in China to induce
them to purchase scrap metal. The payments were made to foreign officials
primarily in the form of commissions, refunds, and gratuities via off-book
foreign bank accounts.90

The Salam and Wooh cases demonstrate that the SEC and DOJ are
instituting FCPA enforcement against individuals involved in bribery,
not just in the United States, but in foreign nations, as well.

87. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, 2008 Year-End FCPA Update (Jan. 5, 2009),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/2008Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx [hereinafter
Gibson, Dunn 2008 Year-End FCPA Update].
88. Searcey, supra note 87.
89. Margaret Ayes, John Davis, Nicole Healy & Alexandra Wrage, Developments
in International Efforts to Prevent Corruption, 41 INT’L L. 597, 599 (2007).
90. NEWCOMB, supra note 78, at 18.
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C. FCPA Enforcement in Foreign Nations
Speaking at an FCPA conference, DOJ’s Mendelsohn called 2008 the
year of “foreign coordination.”91 Obviously, the biggest single instance was
the Siemens case, where the U.S. officials worked with German colleagues.
The DOJ’s Friedrich echoed this sentiment: “We are now working with
our foreign law enforcement colleagues in bribery investigations to a
degree that we never have previously.”92 And, as reported in the Wall
Street Journal, anti-bribery prosecutors from around the globe gathered
in Paris during the summer of 2008 for an “informal, roll-up-your sleeves
meeting” as part of a first-of-its kind effort to increase collaboration in
international investigations.93 Not only have the SEC and the DOJ
stepped up enforcement of the FCPA in the United States, but other
nations are increasingly active in bringing charges against non-U.S.
citizens and companies for corruption and bribery. As one author has
noted:
One of the clearest trends in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement
today is increased cooperation between the authorities of the United States and
those of other nations—and the consequent rise of multijurisdictional
investigations. The U.S. Department of Justice is more than ever before reaching
out to its counterparts, particularly in Western Europe, to share evidence and
theories and obtain access to witnesses.94

European Union nations, including Germany and the United Kingdom
(U.K.), appear to be coordinating with U.S. law enforcement in major
corruption cases, such as the Siemens matter. In addition, one of the
earliest FCPA actions against a foreign corporation involved cooperation
between the United States and Norway:
The Norwegian energy company Statoil ASA became the subject of the first
criminal FCPA enforcement action against a non-U.S. company over a plan to
bribe an Iranian government official in exchange for oil and gas development
contracts. The guilty plea agreement announced in October specifically
mentioned that the Norwegian authorities conducted their own investigation
and, to underscore the point about multinational cooperation, the $21 million

91.
92.
93.
94.

Gibson, Dunn 2008 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 88.
Id.
Id.
Mark Miller, Corruption Cases Go International, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 26, 2007, at

S1.
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penalty imposed in the United States was reduced by the amount of the penalty
levied by the Norwegians.95

Foreign investigations involving FCPA violations is a good sign in the
battle against corruption, but are these types of investigations easy? As
Miller points out, “involvement of a foreign jurisdiction only compounds
the variables affecting . . . decisions” of a company deciding on the
appropriate steps to take when FCPA violations are involved.96
There have been other cases involving FCPA prosecution against
firms in foreign nations since the Statoil ASA case. Other notable FCPA
cases involving foreign corporations include United States v. Vetco Gray
Controls, Inc. et al.,97 and United States v. SSI International Far East,
Ltd.98 In the Vectco Gray case, a subsidiary of the firm, Vetco Gray U.K.
Ltd., was named as a defendant and levied with the largest fine of the
company’s three subsidiaries, a $12 million fine. According to Newcomb,
SSI International Far East, Ltd. was named in their case because, “SSI
Korea made payments to officers and employees of private customers in
South Korea and private and government-owned customers in China to
induce them to purchase scrap metal.99 The payments were made to
foreign officials primarily in the form of commissions, refunds and
gratuities via off-book foreign bank accounts.”100 Vetco Gray and SSI
International are both contained within the information found in
Appendix C.
The FCPA enforcement against individuals—in both the United States
and abroad—and FCPA enforcement against foreign corporations are
two of the most noticeable trends in enforcement of the FCPA. However,
another trend of enforcement tactics by the DOJ and SEC must be
mentioned. Companies that find themselves in violation of the FCPA
are now reporting the violations directly to the SEC and the DOJ in
hopes of avoiding the stiffer penalties and potentially devastating fines
similar to the $28.5 million levied against Titan Corporation.

95. Id.
96. Id. at S4.
97. United States v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc., No. 4:07-CR-00004-001-003 (S.D.
Tex. Feb.17, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vetcocontrols.html.
98. United States v. SSI Int’l Far East, Ltd., No. CR-06-398-KI (D. Or. Oct. 17,
2006).
99. NEWCOMB, supra note 78, at 25.
100. Id.
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D. Self-Reporting of FCPA Violations
Aside from the enforcement of the FCPA against individuals, and the
enforcement of the FCPA against foreign corporations, the next most
prominent trend in FCPA enforcement is the self-reporting of FCPA
violations by corporations. The DOJ and the SEC have taken a more
lenient approach to self-reported illegalities when seeking a sentence for
FCPA violations—at least that is their claim.101 If a corporation has
committed an FCPA violation and brings this fact to the attention of the
SEC or DOJ prior to either agency’s discovery of the deviation of the
law, the punishment for the violation is typically less significant than
those handed down to violators whose undisclosed FCPA digressions are
first discovered by the federal government in an FCPA investigation.
DOJ point man for FCPA issues, Mark Mendelsohn, has stated that
“self-reporting won’t wipe the slate clean,” but that the DOJ, “looks
favorably on corporate confession if it turns into a prosecution.”102
Mendelsohn added: “We reward disclosure and genuine cooperation.”103
Most significantly, the influence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and
the rising economic power of China have had the greatest influence on
the recent trends in FCPA enforcement. The following section and
subsections examine the influences of Sarbanes-Oxley and China on
changes in FCPA enforcement.
IV. INFLUENCES ON CHANGES IN FCPA ENFORCEMENT
As presented in previous sections, enforcement of the FCPA appeared
to be fairly insignificant from the enactment of the law until recent
trends in FCPA enforcement emerged, and the number of cases brought
by the SEC and DOJ increased significantly over a relatively short period of
time. It appears that this increase in FCPA enforcement, as well as
creative enforcement by the federal government, has been influenced by
a number of variables. The enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX) and the emergence of China and other nations as global economic
powers appear to have had a significant influence on the increase in the

101. Id. at 7.
102. Joshua Lipton, Kicking Back at Kickbacks, 6 CORP. COUNS. 17 (Dec. 1, 2006),
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=900005467424#.
103. Id.
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number of FCPA cases in recent years. This section of the article focuses
on the influence of SOX on the enforcement of the FCPA.
Following the Enron debacle and the subsequent WorldCom scandal
in 2001 and 2002, the U.S. federal government took action to avoid
similar situations from taking place in the future. With hopes of placing
more responsibility on top executives and decision makers for future
corporate collapses similar to those of Enron and WorldCom, Congress
passed the SOX in 2002. This SEC-enforced law proclaims that corporate
accounting records must be totally accurate and that all financial
statements be publically certified by the CEO and CFO of publically
held corporations.104 Professor Prentice has stated that SOX requires:
[T]hat CEOs and CFOs of public companies certify that the company’s periodic
reports do not contain material misstatements or omissions and ‘fairly present’
the firms’ financial condition and results of operations. In addition, the officers
must affirm that they are responsible for the internal controls, have designed
them to ensure that material information is brought to their attention, have
evaluated their effectiveness, have presented in the report their conclusions
about their effectiveness, and have discussed in the report any changes in the
internal controls, including corrective actions taken. Section 906(a) creates a
new criminal penalty for officers who knowingly certify an inaccurate financial
statement. Finally, and most significantly, SOX [section] 404 requires the filing
of a management report attested to by the external auditor assessing the
reliability of the issuer’s internal financial controls.105

Not only has the impact of SOX on corporations curbed “massive
securities frauds that undermined the very heart of the federal securities
laws,”106 but it has also had an impact on the enforcement of the FCPA.
According to LaCroix: “[T]he primary reason for the dramatic increase
in the number of FCPA enforcement actions is the self-examination
required under [SOX], interacting with the self-reporting compelled under
the federal prosecutorial guidelines for corporate criminality.”107 SOX
requires senior management to carefully scrutinize their company’s internal
controls and processes. Increased scrutiny often leads to increased selfidentification of FCPA concerns.108
The effect of SOX on the changes in FCPA enforcement may not be
that obvious, however, SOX is arguably the most important piece of

104. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745,
777–78 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2000)).
105. Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX
404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703, 705–06 (2007).
106. Id. at 705.
107. Kevin LaCroix, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A ‘70s Revival and Growing
D&O Risk, NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Apr. 2, 2007 at 21.
108. Id.
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corporate legislation passed by Congress since the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. The law created a situation in which corporate
executives can now be held personally accountable for any misleading
financial information hidden behind the numbers of financial statements.
Combined with FCPA, SOX creates a double-edged sword for the SEC
to wield in the battle against corruption.
V. OTHER IMPORTANT FCPA ISSUES NEEDING
FURTHER EXAMINATION
There are many other significant issues involved with, or related to,
the enforcement of the FCPA, which need more research, but are beyond
the scope of this article. Some of the most important, or most interesting
to this author are:
• Emergence of China as a Global Economic Power. The effect
of the growing power of China, not only on the world economy,
but on the enforcement of anti-bribery laws and treaties. It has
often been stated that bribery is a regular part of doing business in
China109 (although those who study China would argue that the
concepts of guanxi and hong bao are much more complicated
than mere “bribery”).110 Since so many business firms operating

109. “Widespread corruption in China puts many U.S. companies between the
proverbial rock and a hard place…China’s leaders have long acknowledged that
widespread corruption is one of the country’s main problems and have repeatedly vowed
to eliminate it.” Patrick M. Norton, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Dilemma, 33
CHINA BUS. REV. 22 (2006).
110. See, e.g., Alexandra A. Wrage, Bribes and Transparency on Chinese Holidays:
a Primer, WALL S T . J. C HINA R EALTIME R EP . B LOG (Jan. 23, 2009, 2:23 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/01/23/bribes-and-transparency-on-chinese-holid
ays-a-primer/ (Hong Bao are the “‘red envelopes’ stuffed with money traditionally
given between friends, family and business partners during the Spring Festival”).
Guanxi is a complex term which begins with “connections” and represents the ancient
Chinese belief in doing business only with those who already know, or have some
connection with, and the necessity of forming and maintaining such relationships
through a variety of means. See, e.g., Tom Dunfee & Danielle E. Warren, Is Guanxi
Ethical? A Normative Analysis of Doing Business in China, 32 J. BUS. ETHICS 191
(2001). Another source states: “Guanxi. It’s the first word any businessperson learns
upon arriving in China. Loosely translated, guanxi means ‘connections’ and, as any
China veteran will tell you, it is the key to everything: securing a business license,
landing a distribution deal, even finding that coveted colonial villa in Shanghai. Fortunes
have been made and lost based on whether the seeker has good or bad guanxi, and in
most cases a positive outcome has meant knowing the right government official, a
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in China are totally or partially owned by the Chinese government
and strongly influenced by Communist party officials, many
business managers or officers who receive bribes or other
payments may well also be considered “government officials,”
and thus such payment would violate the FCPA.111 As China
moves to the center of global commerce, the interaction of
Chinese business practices and customs with international laws
will be most interesting to follow.
• Foreign National Anti-Corruption Laws. In the past decade
there have been a series of international treaties and agreements
reached, all aimed at combating bribery and corruption, and
many nations have enacted their own anti-bribery laws. In
recent years, foreign anti-corruption enforcement has also
taken center stage in nations such as Australia, Bolivia, Brazil,
China, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Germany, India,
Namibia, Sweden, and the U.K.112 How these laws will be
enforced and how U.S. officials will cooperate and interact with
foreign enforcers will bear watching.
• International Treaties. The most well-known global anticorruption treaty occurred with the 1998 signing of the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials.
This treaty required that the thirty-five member nations of the
OECD enact anti-bribery laws, and all have done so. This law
has spurred the enactment of many national laws as discussed
above.113 But there are also several other important international
agreements such as: (1) The Committee of Experts of the
Follow-Up Mechanism for the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption; (2) The Group of States Against Corruption
(GRECO); (3) The United Nations Convention Against
Corruption; (4) the United Nations Global Compact’s 10th
Principle Against Corruption; and (5) The World Bank’s
Department of Institutional Integrity (INT). Regional
organizations such as the Organization of American States, the
Council of Europe, and more recently the African Union, have

relationship nurtured over epic banquets and gallons of XO brandy.” Frederick Balfour,
You Say Guanxi, I Say Schmoozing, BUS. WK., Nov. 19, 2007, at 84.
111. Patrick M. Norton, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Dilemma, CHINA BUS.
REV., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 22–23.
112. Ayes et al., supra note 87, at 604–07.
113. See supra notes 27–35 and text accompanying.
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also developed anti-corruption conventions. The scope and
influence of each agreement will require more research.
• Anti-Corruption Non-Governmental Organizations. International
business activities by corporations and business people around
the globe are being scrutinized more than ever before. At the
same time, several new anti-corruption compliance organizations
(NGOs) have been founded in recent years, with the goal of
promoting corporate compliance with corruption laws.114
These anti-corruption compliance organizations include such
organizations as (1) Transparency International; (2) The Corner
House; (3) The International Anti-Corruption Conference;
(4) TRACE; and (5) The Center for International Private
Enterprise (CIPE); (6) Business for Social Responsibility, and
many more. These organizations serve as watchdogs to report
corruption, and many also help business firms design and
implement compliance policies to detect bribery before it
becomes public. What role will they play in the future of
international business?
• Does the FCPA Represent Moral Imperialism? Late in the
research for this article, the author came across a fascinating
series of articles arguing both sides of this question. Professor
(now Dean) Steven Salbu wrote a series of thoughtful articles
about ten years ago advocating the position that the FCPA and
other anti-bribery laws represent an imposition of one particular
set of Western ethical principles on the rest of the world who
may not share this ethical, legal basis.115 While some scholars
agree, there have also been a number of well-written articles by
114. See generally Michael Goldhaber, Dirty Companies for Sale, 27 AM. LAW.,
Mar. 4, 2005, 13–14, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/sfb/lawArticleSFB.jsp?id
=900005543369.
115. See generally Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat
to Global Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 419, 441 (1999); Steven R. Salbu, Are
Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and Desirable International Policy
Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century? 24 YALE J. INT’L L.
223 (1999); Steven R. Salbu, Battling Global Corruption in the New Millennium, 31 L. &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 47 (1999); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical
Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229 (1997);
Steven R. Salbu, Information Technology in the War Against International Bribery and
Corruption: The Next Frontier in International Reform, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67 (2001);
Marie M. Dalton, Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification of Cultural Norms in the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 583, 619–20 (2006).
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Professor Philip Nichols and others responding to Salbu
advocating the opposite view—that people in all parts of the
world will benefit if bribery and corruption are eliminated.116
One author has argued that a “culture of corruption” (1) directly
and negatively impacts the safety of ordinary consumers
throughout the world who depend on imports; (2) directly
undermines environmental reform technology and clean-up
efforts globally, and (3) frustrates efforts to achieve very basic
human rights.117 This issue is worthy of much more research
and discussion, but is beyond the scope of this article.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the first twenty-five years after the enactment of the FCPA in 1977,
enforcement of the law was minimal. This law was initially enacted to
prevent U.S. businesses and individuals from using illicit payments to
foreign officials “to influence any official act, induce unlawful action, or
obtain or retain business.”118 Enforcement by the DOJ and SEC during
its first twenty-five years amounted to less than three prosecutions per
year. Several factors led Congress to amend the law in 1988, and again
in 1998. These amendments substantially expanded the scope of the
law.
Since 2004, there has been a tremendous increase in FCPA enforcement
actions by the SEC and DOJ—the number of FCPA investigations over
the past six years has greatly surpassed the actions taken by the Federal
Government during the entire period from the 1977 enactment of the
FCPA through 2002. Significant influences on this development may
include the FCPA amendments, the enactment of SOX, the continuing
series of financial scandals starting with Enron and continuing with the
sub-prime mortgage scandal, the financial meltdown of 2008–2009, and
the increasing globalization of business.
The increase in FCPA prosecutions by the U.S. federal government
has been accompanied by a heightened sense of the need to combat bribery
around the world, to the signing of several important international anticorruption treaties, and to the enactment of laws similar to the FCPA in
116. Phillip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalizations
and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 289 (1999); Phillip M. Nichols, The Myth
of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 627 (2000).
117. See, Elizabeth Spahn, International Bribery: The Moral Imperialism Critiques,
18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 155 (2009); See also, Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and Progeny: Morally Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 689, 701 (2000).
118. Koch, supra note 5, at 383.

120

BIXBY (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 12: 89, 2010]

12/9/2010 2:17 PM

The Lion Awakens
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

many other nations. Along with new laws and treaties, anti-corruption
cooperation between nations has also developed considerably since bribery
in international business has consequences that cross national borders.
Consequently, as more nations around the world enact anti-corruption
laws and join anti-bribery treaties, corporations doing business in foreign
nations are under the microscope. Similarly, as foreign governments
begin to prosecute corporations the world over, international anti-corruption
compliance organizations and NGOs have formed to watch carefully for
signs of corruption. Other organizations assist corporations in understanding
laws such as the FCPA and how to best avoid corruption violations
when doing business in foreign nations.
All of the developments surrounding the FCPA as discussed in this
article, as well as the previously identified key issues needing further
examination, will significantly affect the conduct of international business
in the next decade. It is essential for business leaders and legal scholars
to carefully watch the development of new laws, treaties, and enforcement
techniques, both in the United States and globally, as nations increase
their efforts to eliminate corruption and bribery from international
business transactions.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: PRE-FCPA CASES
Appendix A includes pre-FCPA cases, including parties to the case,
and details and the outcome of the case, all of which can be found in
Table 2 below.
Table 2: Pre-FCPA Cases
Date

Case

Details and Outcome

N/A

United States v. U.S.
Lines, Inc. (Cr. No. )

1978

United States v. Sea-Land
Service, Inc. (Cr. No. 78103)
United States v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc. (Cr. No. 78-49)

Conspiracy to defraud the Federal
Maritime Administration. Fine of
$5,000.
Conspiracy to defraud the Federal
Maritime Administration. Fine of
$5,000.
Conspiracy to defraud the Federal
Maritime Administration and Currency
and Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act. Fines against Seatrain of $260,000
and against a subsidiary, Ocean
Equipment, of $260,000.
Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act (transporting currency in
excess of $5,000 into and out of the
United States without proper reporting).
Fine and civil penalty of $187,000
Currency and Foreign Transactions
Report Act. Fine and civil penalty of
$52,647.

1978

1978-Mar24

United States v. The
Williams Companies (Cr.
No. 78-00144), D.D.C.

1978-Apr12

United States v. Page
Airways, Inc., Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (Cr. No. 79-00273)
(CCH), 96,393 D.D.C.
United States v. Control
Data Corporation (Cr.
No. 78-00210), D.D.C.
United States v. Company
(Cr. No. 78-538),
S.D.N.Y.

1978-Apr26
1978-Jul19

122

Mail fraud and Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act. Fine and
penalty of $1,381,000.
United Brands paid $2.5 million in
bribes to the president of Honduras in
an effort to receive a reduced local tax
on the exportation of bananas. The
company also sought a twenty-year
extension of favorable terms on its
Honduran properties. Fine of $15,000.
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1978-Nov15

1979-Jun-1

1979-Jun-1

United States v.
Westinghouse Electric
Company (Cr. No. 7800566), D.D.C.
United States v. Lockheed
Corporation (Cr. No. 7900270), D.D.C.

False statements to the Export-Import
Bank and Agency for International
Development. Fine of $300,000.
Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act, wire fraud, false
statements to Export Import Bank. Fine
and penalties of $647,000.
False statements to Export-Import Bank
and Commerce Department (Shipper’s
Export Declarations). Fine of $120,000.

United States v.
Gulfstream American
Corporation (formerly
known as Grumman
American Aviation
Corporation) (Cr. No. 7900007), D.D.C.
1979-Jul
United States v. Textron,
Currency and Foreign Transactions
Inc. (Cr. No. 79-00330),
Report Act. Fine and civil penalty of
D.D.C.
$131,670.
1981-Sep-8 United States v.
Mail fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy, false
McDonnell Douglas
statements to Export-Import Bank.
Corporation, et al. (Cr.
No. 79-516), D.D.C.
Note: All above information was taken from FCPA Digest of Cases and Review
Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, by Shearman & Sterling LLP, March 4, 2010, pp. 371–73,
available at http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/ FCPA-Digest-Spring-2010.pdf.
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APPENDIX B: PRE-1998 FCPA CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Appendix B includes FCPA cases prior to the 1998 amendment,
including parties to the case and details and the outcome of the case, all
of which can be found in Tables 3, 4, and 5 on the following pages.
Table 3: Pre-1998 FCPA Criminal Prosecutions
Date

Case

Details and Outcome

1979

United States v. Kenny
International Corp., (Cr. No.
79-372), D.D.C.

1982

United States v. Crawford
Enterprises, Inc., Donald G.
Crawford, William E. Hall,
Mario S. Gonzalez, Ricardo G.
Beltran, Andres I. Garcia,
George S. McLean, Luis A.
Uriarte, Al L. Eyster and
James R. Smith, (Cr. No. H82-224), S.D.Tx, Houston
Division, Crawford Ent.
United States v. C.E. Miller
Corporation and Charles E.
Miller, (Cr. No. 82-788), C.D.
Cal.

The company pled to one count of
violating the FCPA and consented to an
injunction against further FCPA violations.
The corporation was fined $50,000 and
required to pay restitution to the Cook
Islands government in the amount of NZ
$337,000. The chairman of Kenny Int’l
consented to a civil injunction and agreed
to enter a plea of guilty to criminal charges
pending in the Cook Islands.
Pled no contest & fined $3,450,000. D.
Crawford pled no contest & fined
$309,000. W. Hall pled no contest & fined
$150,000. A. Garcia pled no contest &
fined $75,000. A. Eyster pled no contest &
fined $5,000. J. Smith pled no contest &
fined $5,000. G. McLean Acquitted

1982

The corporation pled guilty and was fined
$20,000. The individual defendant pled
guilty and was sentenced to three years’
probation and 500 hours community
service.
Note: All above information was taken from “FCPA Prosecutions and Civil
Enforcement Actions,” Int’l Agreements Relating to Bribery of Foreign Officials, U.S.
Department of Justice.
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APPENDIX B: PRE-1998 FCPA CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
CONTINUED–TABLE 4
Table 4: Pre-1998 FCPA Criminal Prosecutions (continued)
1983

United States v. Marquis King,
(Cr. No. 83-00020), D.D.C.

The defendant pled guilty to violations of
Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act and was sentenced to 14
months incarceration and required to pay
prosecution costs.

1982

United States v. Ruston Gas
Turbines, Inc., (Cr. No. H-82207), S.D. Tex.
United States v. International
Harvester Company, (Cr. No.
82-244), S.D. Tex.

The corporation pled guilty to an FCPA
violation and was fined $750,000.

1982

1983

1983

United States v. Applied
Process Products Overseas,
Inc., (Cr. No. 83-00004),
D.D.C.
United States v. Gary
Bateman, (Cr. No. 83-00005),
D.D.C.

1983

United States v. Sam P.
Wallace Company, Inc., (Cr.
No. 83-0034) (PG), D.P.R.

1983

United States v. Alfonso A.
Rodriguez, (Cr. No. 83-0044
(JP)), D.P.R.

The corporation pled guilty to one count of
conspiracy to violate the FCPA and was
fined $10,000 plus costs of $40,000. An
individual defendant also pled guilty to one
count and was sentenced to one year
incarceration (suspended).
The company pled guilty to an FCPA
violation and was fined $5,000. In addition
it consented to a permanent civil
injunction.
The defendant pled guilty to five CFTR
misdemeanors and was sentenced to three
years probation. In addition, he agreed to
pay a civil penalty of $229,512, a civil tax
payment of $300,000, and costs of
prosecution of $5,000.
The corporation pled guilty to three counts
of FCPA accounting violations and was
fined $30,000. In addition, it also pled
guilty to a CFTR violation and was fined
$500,000.
The defendant pled guilty to one count of
FCPA bribery and was sentenced to three
years’ probation and fined $10,000.
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1985

United States v. Harry G.
Carpenter and W.S. Kirkpatrick,
Inc., (Cr. No. 85-353), D.N.J.

1985

United States v. Silicon
Contractors, Inc., Diversified
Group, Inc., Herbert D. Hughes,
Ronald R. Richardson, Richard L.
Noble and John Sherman, (Cr. No.
85-251), E.D. La.
United States v. NAPCO
International, Inc. and Venturian
Corporation, (Cr. No. 4-89-65), D.
Minn.

1989

1989

United States v. Richard H. Liebo,
(Cr. No. 4-89-76), D. Minn.

1989

United States v. Goodyear
International Corp., (Cr. No. 890156), D.D.C.
United States v. Joaquin Pou,
Alfredo G. Duran, and Jose Guasch
(S.D. Fla. 1989)
United States v. Robert Neil Gurin
(S.D. Fla.)
United States v. Young Rubicam
Inc., Arthur R. Klein, Thomas
Spangenberg, Arnold Foote Jr.,
Eric Anthony Abrahams, and
Steven M. McKenna, (Cr. No. N89-68 (PCD)), D. Conn.
United States v. George V. Morton,
(Cr. No. 3-90-061-H), N.D. Tex.
(Dallas Div.).

1989

1990

1990
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The corporation pled guilty to an
FCPA violation and was fined
$75,000. The individual defendant
pled guilty to one count FCPA bribery
and was sentenced to three years
probation, community service, and a
fine of $10,000.
The corporation pled guilty to an
FCPA violation, agreed to a permanent
civil injunction, and was fined
$150,000. Hughes, Richardson, Noble
and Sherman agreed to permanent
injunctions in a civil case.
The defendants pled guilty to three
counts of FCPA bribery and were
fined $785,000. In addition, they paid
$140,000 in a civil settlement and
$75,000 to settle tax charges.
The defendant was convicted of FCPA
bribery and false statements and was
sentenced to eighteen months
incarceration (suspended) with three
years probation.
The corporation pled guilty to one
count of FCPA bribery and was fined
$250,000.
Guasch and Gurin pled guilty to
conspiracy to violate the FCPA; Duran
was acquitted at trial; Pou jumped bail.

The company pled guilty to one count
of conspiracy to violate FCPA and was
fined $500,000.

The defendant pled guilty to one count
of conspiracy to violate FCPA and was
sentenced to three years probation.
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1990

United States v. John Blondek,
Vernon R. Tull, Donald Castle and
Darrell W.T. Lowry, (Cr. 741),
N.D. Tex.

Two of the defendants were acquitted
at trial. The charges were dismissed
against the two remaining defendants.
In separate cases, the Canadian agent,
Morton, pled to conspiracy to violate
the FCPA and the company agreed to
a civil injunction enjoining it from
future violations of the FCPA.
1990 United States v. F.G. Mason
The corporation pled guilty to one
Engineering and Francis G.
count of conspiracy to violate the
Mason, (Case No. B-90-29), JAC,
FCPA, was fined $75,000, and was
D. Conn.
required to pay restitution of
$160,000. The individual defendant
also pled guilty to one count of
conspiracy to violate the FCPA, was
sentenced to five years probation, and
was fined $75,000 (joint with
Company).
1990 United States v. Harris Corporation,
The court granted a motion for
John D. Iacobucci and Ronald L.
judgment of acquittal at the close of
Schultz, (Cr. No. 90-0456), N.D. Cal. the government’s case.
1994 United States v. Herbert Steindler,
One defendant pled guilty to three
Rami Dotan, and Harold Katz, (Cr. counts of conspiracy, wire fraud and
No. 194-29), S.D. Ohio.
money laundering and was sentenced
to 84 months incarceration and
required to forfeit $1,741,453. The
remaining defendants are fugitives.
Note: All above information was taken from “FCPA Prosecutions and Civil
Enforcement Actions,” Int’l Agreements Relating to Bribery of Foreign Officials, U.S.
Department of Justice.
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APPENDIX B: PRE-1998 FCPA CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
CONCLUDED–TABLE 5
Table 5: Pre-1998 FCPA Criminal Prosecutions (concluded)
Date

Case

Details and Outcome

1994

United States v. Vitusa
Corporation, (Cr. No. 94253)(MTB), D.N.J.
United States v. Denny
Herzberg, (Cr. No. 94254)(MTB), D.N.J.
United States v. Lockheed
Corporation, Suleiman A.
Nassar and Allen R. Love, (Cr.
No. 1:94-Cr-22-016), N.D.,
Ga. Atlanta Div.

The corporation pled guilty to an FCPA
violation and was fined $20,000.

1994

The defendant pled guilty to an FCPA
violation and was sentenced to two years
probation and fined $5,000.
1994
The corporation pled guilty to conspiracy
to violate the FCPA and was fined $21.8
million. In addition, it had to pay a $3
million civil settlement. Defendant Nassar
pled guilty to two counts and was
sentenced to eighteen months
imprisonment. Defendant Love pled
guilty to one count in a related case and
was fined $20,000.
Note: All above information was taken from “FCPA Prosecutions and Civil
Enforcement Actions,” Int’l Agreements Relating to Bribery of Foreign Officials,
U.S. Department of Justice.
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APPENDIX C: NOTABLE FCPA CASES IN RECENT YEARS
Appendix C includes notable FCPA cases from 2003–2010, including
parties to the case, and details and the outcome of the case, all of which
can be found in Table 6 below through Table 8 on the following pages.
Table 6: Notable FCPA Cases in Recent Years
Date

Case

Details and Outcome

2010

United States v. BAE Systems
PLC (D.D.C. 2010)

2009

United States v. Daniel Alvirez
and Lee Allen Tolleson (D.D.C.
2009)
United States v. Helmie Ashiblie
(D.D.C. 2009)
United States v. Andrew Bigelow
(D.D.C. 2009)
United States v. R. Patrick
Caldwell and Stephen Gerard
Giordanella (D.D.C. 2009)

In 2000, BAE Systems PLC formerly
British Aerospace, made commitments
to the U.S. government to create and
implement policies and procedures to
fall under compliance with FCPA. On
February 4, 2010, the DOJ filed a
criminal information, charging BAE
with conspiring to defraud the United
States and to make false statements to
the U.S. government, and violating the
Arms Export Control Act and
International Traffic in Arms
Regulations. BAE pleaded guilty and
agreed to pay $400 million in
penalties, implement a compliance
system, and to retain a compliance
monitor for three years. BAE was not
charged with FCPA liability.
On December 11, 2009, the DOJ
charged the twenty-two executives and
employees in the military and law
enforcement equipment industry with
conspiring to violate the FCPA,
substantive violations of the FCPA,
and conspiring to engage in money
laundering. This is the single largest
investigation and prosecution against
individuals in the history of the
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2009July

2009

130

United States v. Yochanen R.
Cohen (D.D.C. 2009)
United States v. Haim Geri
(D.D.C. 2009)
United States v. Gregory Godsey
and Mark Frederick Morales
(D.D.C. 2009)
United States v. Amaro Goncalves
(D.D.C. 2009)
United States v. Saul Mishkin
(D.D.C. 2009)
United States v. John M.
Mushriqui and Jeana Mushriqui
(D.D.C. 2009)
United States v. David R. Painter
and Lee M. Wares (D.D.C. 2009)
United States v. Pankesh Patel
(D.D.C. 2009)
United States v. Ofer Paz (D.D.C.
2009)
United States v. Jonathan M.
Spiller (D.D.C. 2009)
United States v. Israel Weisler
and Michael Sacks (D.D.C. 2009)
United States v. John Benson
Wier (D.D.C. 2009)
United States v. Control
Components, Inc. (C.D. Ca 2009)

United States v. Novo Nordisk
A/S, (D.D.C. 2009)

12/9/2010 2:17 PM

enforcement of FCPA. The FBI was
brought in to complete the undercover
investigation. The outcome is
undetermined at this time.

CCI pleaded guilty to two counts of
violations of the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA and one count
of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and
Travel Act. CCI agreed to pay a
criminal fine of $18.2 million as well
as adopt an anti-corruption compliance
code, and a three year probation
period. Six executives and two former
employees have been indicted on
related allegations. See below.
Novo Nordisk was charged with
conspiracy to commit wire fraud and
violate the books and records
provisions of the FCPA. Charges were
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2009

United States v. Stuart Carson,
Hong Carson, Paul Cosgrove,
David Edmonds, Flavio Ricotti,
and Han Yong Kim (C.D. Ca
2009)

2009Feb

United States v. Jeffery Tesler
and Wojciech J. Chodan (S.D.
Tex. 2009)

2009Feb

United States v. Kellogg Brown &
Root LLC (S.D. Tex. 2009)

dropped in exchange for a fine of $9
million, cooperation with further
investigation, a compliance program,
$3 million in civil penalties, and $6
million in disgorgement of profits in a
settlement with the SEC.
All six defendants were indicted for
conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the
Travel Act. Additionally, Carson was
indicted on two counts of bribery and
one count for obstruction of justice for
intentionally destroying records.
Cosgrove was indicted on six counts of
bribery under the FCPA and one count
under the Travel Act. Edmonds was
indicted on three counts of bribery
under the FCPA and two counts under
the Travel Act. Ricotti was indicted on
one count of bribery under the FCPA
and three counts under the Travel Act.
Kim was indicted on two counts of
bribery under the FCPA.”
The eleven-count indictment includes
one count of conspiring to violate the
anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA
and ten counts of violating the antibribery provisions of the FCPA. The
DOJ is seeking $132 million from
Tesler and Chodan if convicted on
more than one count.
Kellogg Brown & Root LLC pleaded
guilty to one count of conspiring to
violate the FCPA and four counts of
violating the anti-bribery provisions of
the FCPA. KBR agreed to pay $402
million and Halliburton agreed to pay
$382 million of the fine. Halliburton
and KBR settled a separate SEC case
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2008

United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft (D.D.C 2008)
United States v. Siemens
S.A.(Argentina) (D.D.C 2008)
United States v. Siemens
Bangladesh Ltd. (D.D.C 2008)
United States v. Siemens S.A.
(Venezuela) (D.D.C. 2008)

2008Jan

United States v. James K. Tillery
and Paul G. Novak (S.D. Tex.
2008)

2008

United States v. Fiat S.p.A., et al.
United States v. Iveco S.p.A.
(2008)
United States v. CNH Italia S.p.A.
(2008)
United States v. CNH France S.A.
(2008)

132
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paying disgorgement of $177 million
in profits. In September 2008, Albert
Stanley, former CEO and Chairman of
Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, admitted
he participated in a scheme to bribe
Nigerian government officials.
This seller of power and electrical
equipment was the first company ever
charged with a criminal violation of
the FCPA. Siemens AG (Argentina)
pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate
the FCPA’s books and records
provisions and paid criminal fines of
$450 million on top of $350 million
disgorgement of ill-gotten profits.
German authorities collected additional
penalties. Independent monitors were
put in place for four years, and $3
million in bank accounts were
forfeiture for a bribery scheme in
Bangladesh.
This oil and gas pipeline construction
company was indicted on one count of
conspiracy to violate the FCPA, two
counts of violating FCPA, and one
count of conspiracy to commit money
laundering.
In the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program in
Iraq, the DOJ charged Iveco and CNH
Italia with conspiracy to commit wire
fraud and violate the FCPA’s books
and records provisions. DOJ also
alleged CNH France conspired to
commit wire fraud. Fiat entered into a
three-year deferred prosecution
agreement with the DOJ and agreed to
pay $7 million. In 2008, Fiat and CNH
Global entered an agreement with the
SEC for failure to maintain internal
controls and for books and records
violations. This agreement resulted in
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2008

United States v. Shu Quan-Sheng
(E.D. Va. 2008)

2008

United States v. Albert Jackson
Stanley (2008)

2008June

United States v. Faro
Technologies Inc. (2008)

2008

United States v. Willbros Group,
Inc., and Willbros Int’l, Inc.
(2008)

2008

United States v. AB Volvo (2008)
United States v. Volvo Construction
Equipment AB (2008)
United States v. Renault Trucks

$5.3 million in disgorgement of
profits, pre-judgment interest of $1.9
million, and $3.6 million in civil
penalty.
Shu Quan-Sheng pled guilty to one
count of violating the FCPA and two
counts of violating the Arms Control
Export Act. Shu was ordered to forfeit
$356,740 in commission payments,
and was sentenced to fifty-one months
in prison, followed by a two year
supervised release.
Albert Stanley, a former director of
Kellogg, Brown, & Root, Inc. pleaded
guilty to one count of conspiring to
violate the FCPA and one count of
conspiring to commit mail and wire
fraud. Stanley faces seven years in
prison and payment of $10.8 million in
restitution.
Faro entered into a two year deferredprosecution agreement and agreed to
pay $1.1 million in criminal penalties
and a two-year period with an
independent compliance officer.
Willbros Group and Willbros
International, procurement companies
of oil and gas construction contracts,
entered into a three year deferred
prosecution agreement. A $22 million
fine will be collected in four
installments, and have a position for an
independent corporate monitor for
three years.
The parent company of Volvo
Construction and Renault Trucks SAS,
AB Volvo, entered into a three-year
differed prosecution agreement with
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SAS (2008)

2007

United States v. Gerald Green
and Patricia Green (C.D. Cal.
2007)

2007

United States v. Chevron Corp.
(S.D.N.Y. 2007)

2007Apr

United States v. Baker Hughes
Svcs. Int’l, Inc. (No: H-07-129)
(S.D. Tex. April 2007)

134
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the DOJ and agreed to pay a fine of $7
million. VCE and Renault were alleged
to have committed conspiracy to
commit wire fraud and violate FCPA’s
books and records provisions.
The Greens were arrested for money
laundering, tax counts (Patricia) and an
added count of obstruction of justice
against Gerald. The Greens created
contracts for the annual Bangkok
International Film Festival. The
Greens were found guilty of
conspiracy to violate the FCPA and
money laundering laws, and Patricia
Green was found guilty of falsely
subscribing U.S. income tax returns.
Under the United Nations Oil-for-Food
Program the Chevron Corp. purchased
oil from Iraq. Chevron entered into a
two-year deferred-prosecution
agreement and agreed to pay a total of
$27 million. In addition, the SEC
issued charges against Chevron
resulting in a monetary penalty of $3
million and disgorgement of $25
million.
Baker Hughes is a U.S. oilfield
services company. BHSI pleaded
guilty to violations of the anti-bribery
and books and records provisions of
the FCPA and agreed to an $11 million
criminal fine. BHSI also agreed to
serve a three-year term of
organizational probation and adopt a
comprehensive anti-bribery
compliance program.
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2006Feb

United States v. Vetco Gray
Controls Inc. et al., (No. 4:07-cr00004) (S.D. Tex. February 2006)
United States v. Aibel Group Ltd.
(No. 4:07-cr-00005) (S.D. Tex.
February 2006)

2006

United States v. Christian
Sapsizian and Edgar Valverde
Acosta (No. 1:06-cr-20797) (S.D.
Fla. 2006)

2006

United States v. Jim Bob Brown
(No. 4:06-cr-00316) (S.D. Tex.
2006)

Vetco Gray Controls Inc., Vetco Gray
Controls Ltd., and Vetco Gray UK Ltd.
pleaded guilty to violations of the antibribery provisions of the FCPA and
agreed to a collective fine of $26
million, paying $6 million, $8 million
and $12 million respectively. They
also agreed to hire an independent
monitor to oversee the implementation
of a robust compliance program, to
undertake an investigation of the
company’s operations as required
under FCPA Opinion Release 04-02,
and to agree that any potential buyer of
the company would be bound to those
monitoring and investigation
conditions.
Aibel Group Ltd entered a deferred
prosecution agreement relating to the
same underlying conduct.
On March 20, 2007, a superseding
indictment was filed against Mr.
Sapsizian and Mr. Acosta. On June 7,
2007, the DOJ announced that Mr.
Sapsizian pleaded guilty to two counts
of conspiracy and violating the FCPA.
He now faces up to ten years in prison,
$250,000 in fines, and $330,000 in
forfeiture. The terms of his plea
agreement provide for an immediate
forfeiture of $261,500. Sentencing for
Mr. Sapsizian has been set for
December 20, 2007. Separately, on
June 14, 2007, the Court transferred
Mr. Acosta to fugitive status.
On September 14, 2006, the DOJ
reported that Brown pleaded guilty to
violating the FCPA by conspiring with
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others to bribe Nigerian and
Ecuadorian officials. Brown is
cooperating with the government’s
ongoing investigation as part of his
plea agreement.
2006- United States v. SSI Int’l Far
SSI Korea agreed to plead guilty to
Oct
East, Ltd. (No. CR 06-398-KI)
violating the anti-bribery and
(D. Or. October 2006)
accounting provisions of the FCPA
and pay a $7.5 million penalty.
Schnitzer Steel entered into a threeyear deferred prosecution agreement
and agreed to retain a compliance
monitor for three years. In the SEC
proceeding, Schnitzer Steel agreed to
pay disgorgement and prejudgment
interest of $7.7 million and retain a
compliance monitor.
Note: Above information through United States v. Baker Hughes Svcs. Int’l, Inc was
taken from FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign
Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, by D. Newcomb, October
5, 2007, pp. 23–27; Cases after United States v. Baker Hughes Svcs. Int’l, were taken
from FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign
Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1997, by Shearman & Sterling
LLP, October 1, 2009, pp. 31–77, and the most recent information is from FCPA
Digest of Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1997, by Shearman & Sterling LLP, March 4,
2010, available at http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA-Digest-Spring-2010.pdf.
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APPENDIX C: NOTABLE FCPA CASES IN RECENT YEARS
CONTINUED–TABLE 7
Table 7: Notable FCPA Cases in Recent Years (continued)
Date

Case

Details and Outcome

2006Oct

United States v. Statoil ASA
(No. 06-cr-00960-RJH-1)
(S.D.N.Y. October 2006)

2006Jun

United States v. Steven
Lynwood Head (No. 06-cr01380) (S.D.Cal. June 2006)

2006Mar

United States v. Richard John
Novak (No. 05-180-3-LRS)
(E.D.Wash. March 2006)

Statoil entered a three-year deferred
prosecution agreement and has admitted to
violating the anti-bribery and accounting
provisions of the FCPA. It has also agreed
to pay a $10.5 million penalty. In the SEC
proceeding, it has agreed to pay $10.5
million in disgorgement and retain a monitor.
Statoil has already paid a NOK 20 million
($3.045 million USD) fine to the Norway
National Authority for Investigation and
Prosecution of Economic Crime, without
admitting or denying any liability, which
will be deducted from the U.S. fines. On
October 18, 2004, Richard Hubbard accepted
a fine of NOK 200,000 ($30,300).
Steven Lynwood Head pled guilty to a
one-count information charging
falsification of the books, records and
accounts of an issuer under the federal
securities laws. Pursuant to the plea
agreement, Head will cooperate with the
government’s ongoing investigation of
individuals formerly associated with Titan.
In September 2007, Head was sentenced to
six months imprisonment, supervised
release for a term of three years, and a
$5,000 fine.
On March 20, 2006, Novak pled guilty to
one count of violating the FCPA and an
additional count of wire fraud and mail
fraud. Additional defendants involved in
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the scheme have either pled guilty or are
currently being prosecuted on various nonFCPA charges.
2006
United States v. Faheem
The government filed criminal information
Mousa Salam (No. 06-cragainst Salam on June 7, 2006. On August
00157-RJL) (D.D.C. 2006)
4, 2006, Salam pled guilty to one count of
violating the anti-bribery provisions of the
FCPA. On February 2, 2007, Salam was
sentenced to three years in prison followed
by two years of supervised release.
In a company filing dated August 2005,
2005
United States v. DPC
DPC disclosed that it had agreed to pay
(Tianjin) Co. Ltd., (No. CR
approximately $4.8 million as part of a
05-482) (C.D. CAL 2005)
settlement with the SEC and DOJ,
In the Matter of Diagnostic
consisting of $2.0 million in fines and
Products Corporation, SEC
approximately $2.8 million in
Administrative Proceeding
disgorgement of profits and interest. In
File No. 3-11933
addition, Tianjin pled guilty to violations
(May 20, 2005)
of the FCPA, was issued a cease and desist
order, and agreed to take certain actions,
including engaging an independent
monitor for its FCPA activities in China,
to avert future violations.
2002United States v. David Kay
As vice president of marketing for ARI,
Apr
(Cr. No. 4-01-914) S.D. Tex.,
David Kay was responsible for supervising
2001Dec. 12, 2001.
sales and marketing in Haiti. Kay was
Dec
United States v. David Kay
charged with twelve counts of violating
and Douglas Murphy, (Cr.
the FCPA. Douglas Murphy, as president
No. 4-01-914) S.D. Tex., Apr. of ARI, was also charged with twelve
2002
counts of violating the FCPA. In May
2002, U.S. District Judge David Hittner
dismissed the indictments against Murphy
and Kay.
Note: All above information was taken from FCPA Digest of Cases and Review
Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977, by D. Newcomb, October 5, 2007, pp. 28–50, Shearman & Sterling LLP.
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APPENDIX C: NOTABLE FCPA CASES IN RECENT YEARS
CONCLUDED–TABLE 8
Table 8: Notable FCPA Cases in Recent Years (concluded)
Date

Case

Details and Outcome

2005Oct

United States v. Viktor Kozeny,
Frederic Bourke, Jr., and David
Pinkerton (Cr. No. 05-518)
(S.D.N.Y. October 2005)
United States v. Hans Bodmer
(Cr. No. 03-947) (S.D.N.Y.,
August 2003)
United States v. Clayton Lewis
(Cr. No. 03-930) (S.D.N.Y., July
2003)
United States v. Thomas Farrell
(Cr. No. 03-290) (S.D.N.Y.,
March 2003)

On October 6, 2005, Kozeny, Bourke,
and Pinkerton were charged in a twentyseven-count indictment in U.S. District
Court in Manhattan. The indictment
seeks, among other things,
$174,000,000 in fines and forfeiture.
Kozeny, an Irish citizen and resident of
the Bahamas, has challenged the right of
the United States to seek his extradition
given that he is neither a U.S. citizen,
nor a resident, and was not in violation
of an offence under Bahamian law. On
September 28, 2006, a court in the
Bahamas ordered Kozeny to be extradited,
although Kozeny’s lawyers announced
that they intended to appeal the order.
On June 21, 2007, the District Court in
the Southern District of New York
granted the motions to dismiss of
Bourke and Pinkerton as to all FCPA
counts. The court found that the
indictment was time-barred because the
government did not move to suspend the
running of the statute of limitations to
allow it to collect foreign evidence until
after the statute of limitations had
expired. The court found that filing such
an application must be done before the
running of the ordinary statute of
limitations. The court found, in dicta,
that the allegations were otherwise
sufficient to withstand a motion to

2003Aug
2003Jul
2003Mar
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dismiss. Certain false statements counts
against the defendants survived the
motion to dismiss.
On July 5, 2007, the government moved
for reconsideration of the court’s June
21, 2007 decision, arguing that three of
the counts of the indictment (including
conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the
Travel Act and a substantive FCPA
violation) should not have been dismissed
as time-barred. The court agreed with
the government and on July 16, 2007,
granted the government’s motion for
reconsideration and reinstated these
three counts. The government appealed
the balance of the court’s June 21, 2007
order to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit on July
19, 2007. The appeal is currently being
briefed, and oral argument is set for
October 19, 2007.
2005
United States v. Titan
Titan pleaded guilty on March 1, 2005,
Corporation (Cr. No. 05-314),
to three felony counts of violating the
S.D. Cal. 2005
FCPA and agreed to pay a criminal fine
of $13 million, along with a civil
penalty and disgorgement to the SEC in
the amount of approximately $15.5
million. Titan also agreed to retain an
independent consultant to review and
further implement its FCPA compliance
procedures. The combined penalty,
$28.5 million, is the largest fine ever
imposed on a company in the history of
the FCPA.
Note: All above information was taken from FCPA Digest of Cases and Review
Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977, by D. Newcomb, October 5, 2007, pp. 32–40, Shearman & Sterling LLP.
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APPENDIX D: INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION TREATIES
Appendix D contains a list of International Anti-Corruption Treaties, all
of which can be found in Table 9 below and continued on the next page.
Table 9: International Anti-Corruption Treaties
Treaty Name

Purpose and Overview

Mutual Evaluation Mechanisms

The Committee of Experts of the Follow-Up
Mechanism for the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption began the second round of
reviews this year. The Committee met again in
December 2006 (too late for inclusion in this
update) to finalize the first six reports.
Peer review organization that monitors the States
Parties’ compliance with the Council of Europe’s
anticorruption instruments issued second round
reports on Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, and the
Ukraine.
Working Group on Bribery Monitors
implementation of the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions. In 2006, the OECD
Working Group issued phase two country reports
for Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
and Spain and progress reports for Bulgaria,
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, and
Luxembourg.
The United Nations Convention Against
Corruption entered into force on December 14,
2005, and the first Conference of States Parties
(COSP) was held in December 2006 in Amman,
Jordan. The United States deposited its instrument
of ratification on October 30, 2006.

The Group of States Against
Corruption (GRECO)

The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International
Business Transactions

The United Nations Convention
Against Corruption
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The U.N. Global Compact is an international
multi-stakeholder initiative that brings companies
together with U.N. agencies, labor, and civil
society to promote responsible corporate
citizenship through promotion of ten voluntary
universal principles in the areas of human rights,
labor, the environment, and anti-corruption. In 2006,
the Global Compact Office published Business
Against Corruption – Case Stories and Examples, a
collection of case stories illustrating how its
participants implemented the 10th Principle
Against Corruption.
The World Bank
The World Bank’s Department of Institutional
Integrity (INT) investigates allegations of fraud,
corruption, collusion, and coercion, as well as
obstructive practices related to Bank operations.
The Bank is currently enhancing its investigation
and sanctioning capabilities with proactive tools
that further combat corruption through prevention
and deterrence. One of these new tools is the
Voluntary Disclosure Program (VDP), which was
publicly launched on August 1, 2006. Under the
VDP, participants commit to: (1) not engage in
misconduct in the future; (2) disclose to the Bank
the results of an internal investigation into past bad
acts in Bank-financed or supported projects or
contracts; and (3) implement a robust internal
compliance program monitored by a Bank
approved compliance monitor. Participants pay the
costs associated with almost every step of the VDP
process. In exchange for full cooperation, VDP
participants avoid debarment for disclosed past
misconduct, their identities are kept confidential,
and they may continue to compete for Banksupported projects.
Note: All above information was taken from Developments in U.S. and International
Efforts to Prevent Corruption, by M. Ayres, J. Davis, N. Healy & A. Wrage, Summer
2007, pp. 608–609, The International Lawyer.
United Nations Global
Compact’s 10th Principle
Against Corruption
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APPENDIX E: ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE ORGANIZATIONS
Appendix E contains a list of Anti-Corruption Compliance Organizations,
all of which can be found in Tables 10 and 11 below.
Table 10: Anti-Corruption Compliance Organizations
Organization Name

Purpose and Overview

Center for International Private
Enterprise’s (CIPE)

The Center for International Private
Enterprise’s (CIPE) anti-corruption work
targets both supply- and demand-side
corruption – those who demand bribes in
exchange for services and those who supply
bribes and demand preferential treatment. In
2006, CIPE partnered with TRACE to
provide anti-bribery training in seven
countries. CIPE worked with Transparency
International to promote the implementation
of the Business Principles for Countering
Bribery and to develop a Small to Medium
Enterprise (SME) anti-bribery toolkit. In
Lebanon, CIPE and the Lebanese
Transparency Association developed and
introduced a corporate governance code for
SMEs. In Mozambique, CIPE teamed with
the Sofala Commercial and Industrial
Association to survey the business
community, gauge corruption perceptions,
and develop policy recommendations to
reduce corruption. In Russia, CIPE is
working with the INDEM foundation to
provide businesspeople with tools to resist
extortion by government officials.
U.K.-based research and advocacy group that
focuses on how the government can combat
corruption, and monitors particular cases of
corruption involving U.K. companies and

The Corner House
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individuals. In April 2006, the United
Kingdom’s Export Credits Guarantee
Department (ECGD) accepted many of the
Corner House’s recommendations with
regard to tightening its anti-corruption
procedures. This followed an extensive
consultation that resulted from Corner
House’s judicial review of the ECGD’s
earlier weakening of these procedures after
industry lobbying. The Corner House also
gave evidence to an influential Parliamentary
Committee enquiry, the All Party Group, on
Africa. The U.K. government’s response to
the Committee’s final report in June 2006
included taking up one of the Corner
House’s key recommendations to the
government of setting up a special police
unit specifically to investigate overseas
corruption offenses.
The International Anti-Corruption
On November 15-18, 2006, Guatemala
Conference
hosted the 12th International AntiCorruption Convention. The more than 1000
representatives of 115 nations met in plenary
and in workshops to discuss a range of issues
in anti-corruption efforts, focusing on
practical measures to reduce its deleterious
effects. The resolution issued at the end of
the conference focused on effective
implementation of the UNCAC. The plenary
also issued an “Action Agenda” to guide
future efforts
Note: All above information was taken from Developments in U.S. and International
Efforts to Prevent Corruption, by M. Ayres, J. Davis, N. Healy & A. Wrage, Summer
2007, pp. 610–611, The International Lawyer.
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APPENDIX E: ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE ORGANIZATIONS
(CONCLUDED)–TABLE 11
Table 11: Anti-Corruption Compliance Organizations
(concluded)
Organization Name

Purpose and Overview

TRACE

A nonprofit business association working with
companies to improve their anti-bribery
programs while lowering the cost associated
with compliance. TRACE undertakes
benchmarking research and disseminates the
results to companies to help them ensure that
their policies are squarely within “best
practices.” In cooperation with partner law firms
in seventy countries, TRACE also maintains an
online Resource Center with summaries of
foreign local law. At the end of 2006, TRACE
announced the launch of BRIBEline, a
multilingual anonymous hotline that will enable
those from whom bribes are demanded to report
the demand by country and government
ministry. The information will be collated and
reported in the aggregate as a new empirical
measure of corruption. TRACE also held antibribery workshops in twelve cities worldwide.
The workshops are open to the public and cover
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
international conventions, and local law.
Transparency International (TI) and its chapters
in ninety-five countries work with governments,
civil society, and the private sector to address
domestic and international corruption. TI has
developed a set of corruption assessment tools,
including National Integrity Surveys, the Global
Corruption Barometer, the Bribe Payers Index,
and the Corruption Perceptions Index. The 2006
TI Global Corruption Report provided an

Transparency International.
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overview of the state of corruption around the
world with a focus on the health sector. TI also
advocates for effective development assistance
by promoting anti-corruption and transparency
requirements within major donor institutions
such as the World Bank, actively promoting the
development, implementation, and monitoring of
international anti-corruption conventions,
promoting transparency requirements in trade
agreements, developing tools to enhance antibribery standards in the private sector, and
publishing an annual Progress Report on
Enforcement of the OECD Convention to keep
pressure on governments to increase
enforcement. TI has also worked to secure U.S.
ratification of the UNCAC and has developed
recommendations for an effective UNCAC
monitoring process.
Note: All above information was taken from Developments in U.S. and International
Efforts to Prevent Corruption, by M. Ayres, J. Davis, N. Healy & A. Wrage, Summer
2007, pp. 610–611, The International Lawyer.
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